

CONFIDENTIAL 4 May 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : IAC Views expressed at IAC Meeting of 4 May 1954
on Likelihood of Chinese Communist intervention
in Indochina.

Reference : Annex to NSC Planning Board Paper, dated 5 April
1954, designated "NSC Action No. 1074-a"

1. Acting Chairman, polled the IAC members on the question as to whether world events of the last month had caused them to change their estimates made in IAC Memorandum dated 6 April 1954 as to the likelihood of Chinese Communist overt intervention in Indochina in the event prior US intervention in Indochina had resulted in the imminent destruction of the Viet Minh field forces:

- a. G-2/State -- odds somewhat greater than stated 6 April that Chinese Communists would intervene.
- b. ONI -- no change in 6 April estimate.
- c. AFOIN -- no change, though General Sanford interpreted AFOIN's 6 April, and present, estimate as being "odds about 50-50."
- d. JIG -- no change, though General Porter interpreted JIG's 6 April, and present, estimate as "we really don't know."

STATE, ARMY, USAF reviews completed

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3. JIG also wished to record the fact that it felt that an additional point should have been made by the IAC in paragraph 12 of its 6 April memorandum, relating to paragraph 30 b of referenced Annex. Following "Any commitment of Chinese Nationalist forces in Indochina prior to open intervention of the Chinese Communists would increase the risk of such Chinese Communist intervention," a sentence should have been added, in JIG's view, to the effect that commitment of Chinese Nationalist forces outside Indochina, as for example in an assault on Hainan, would decrease the risk of Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina.

25X1 4. also polled the IAC members on the question as to whether the introduction of US ground forces into South Vietnam only, in conjunction with Courses A and B of referenced Annex, would change the odds previously estimated (paragraph 2 above) of Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina to save the Viet Minh field forces. The replies were as follows:

- a. G-2 -- odds about the same.
- b. OIR/AFOIN -- odds about the same. The key question would not be the US troops in South Vietnam, but the likelihood (in the Communist mind) of the destruction of the Viet Minh field forces.

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- c. ONI -- odds somewhat greater that Chinese Communists would intervene.
- d. JIG -- odds somewhat greater that Chinese Communists would intervene, but that key to situation would be in US hands. If the US had brought considerable force to bear in Indochina, this posture would cause the Chinese Communists not to intervene.

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